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A measure of honor
Mark D. West, Nippon Life Professor of Law Mark D. West is director
of both the Law School’s Japanese Legal Studies Program and its Center
for International and Comparative Law; he also directs the University of
Michigan’s Center for Japanese Studies. He has studied and taught at
the University of Tokyo and Kyoto University, and has been a Fulbright
Research Scholar, an Abe Fellow, and a fellow of the Japan Society for
the Promotion of Science. Fluent in Japanese, he clerked for the Hon.
Eugene H. Nickerson of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of New York and practiced with the New York-based international law
firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Warton & Garrison LLP. He is the author of
Economic Organizations and Corporate Governance in Japan: The Impact
of Formal and Informal Rules (2004), Law in Everyday Japan: Sex,
Sumo, Suicide, and Statutes (2005), and Secrets, Sex, and Spectacle:
The Rules of Scandal in Japan and the United States, from which this
excerpt is taken. West also is an editor of The Japanese Legal System:
Cases, Codes, and Commentary (2006). He earned his B.A., magna
cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa, from Rhodes College, and his J.D. with
multiple honors from Columbia University School of Law, where he was
notes and comments editor for the Columbia Law Review.
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On amending Executive Order 12866: Good governance or regulatory usurpation?
Sally Katzen Dyk, ’67, a Public Interest/Public Service Fellow at Michigan
Law, served as administrator of the Ofﬁce of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) at the Ofﬁce of Management and Budget (OMB) for the ﬁrst
ﬁve years of the Clinton Administration, then as the deputy assistant to the
president for economic policy and deputy director of the National Economic
Council, and then as the deputy director for management of OMB. She has
taught administrative law and related subjects at Michigan Law as well as
George Mason University Law School and the University of Pennsylvania
Law School. She also has taught undergraduate seminars in American
government at Smith College, Johns Hopkins University, and the University of
Michigan in Washington Program.
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A measure of honor
by Mark D. West
The following excerpt from Secrets, Sex, and Spectacles: The Rules of Scandal in Japan
and the United States (University of Chicago Press, 2006) appears here with permission of
the author and publisher. The selection is from the chapter “Privacy and Honor,” in which
the author finds that Japan has more than twice as many defamation cases per capita than
America, “despite the fact that America has about 50 times more lawyers.”

P

eople in Japan sue despite low damages—and win—over
some things that sound rather silly. Actress Reiko Ohara sued
a publisher of women’s weekly Josei Jishin over an article that
claimed she was causing trouble in her neighborhood by yelling
“Shut up!” at her dog, not cleaning the leaves out of her drainage
ditch, and never apologizing to anyone (she won). Architect
Kisho Kurokawa—whose work was the inspiration for Japan’s
capsule hotels—took a weekly to court because it said that
people in Toyota City did not like the skeletal look or the cost
of a “10-billion-yen dinosaur bridge” that he designed (he won,
too). Dewi Sukarno, a Japanese-born socialist celebrity and
former ﬁrst lady of Indonesia, sued the publisher of the sport
paper Yukan Fuji over claims that her English pronunciation is
poor (they settled in Tokyo District Court). The rules increase
the chances of winning for such people, but even if they had
a 100 percent chance of success, shouldn’t they be able to get
over it?
Law doesn’t wholly capture this phenomenon. The plaintiffs
do not ﬁnd their claims silly. Nor are courts rolling their eyes
and begrudgingly awarding damages; their opinions often sound
as outraged as the plaintiffs’ briefs (though when I discuss the
cases privately with Japanese judges, they volunteer the word
“silly”). Not all plaintiffs are seeking publicity: how much
publicity could be gained by the small-time haiku poets and
traditional storytellers who bring suit?
One reason these cases are not publicly treated as silly is that
the stories actually do damage reputations. In Reiko Ohara’s
case, for instance, the court noted that she would lose considerable income from a resultant inability to appear in television
commercials. If a well-known actress can lose signiﬁcant income
because a tabloid says she yells at her dog, Japanese reputation
seems awfully fragile. I’ve already suggested one possible reason
for the fragility: the defamer, in this case, sensational television
shows and tabloids, might be particularly credible. Or maybe
some defamed people are simply more susceptible to harm; the
organization of the plaintiff’s industry or her social group might
make her particularly vulnerable. More broadly, maybe Japan’s

relative homogeneity and social density lead to a stronger
consensus on what behavior is acceptable or, as in seventeenthcentury American communities, increase a court’s ability to
restore a plaintiff’s honor.
Or maybe the difference lies in litigation strategy, since
some suits seem to have little to do with defamation. In 2002
a group of 131 Tokyo women sued Tokyo governor Ishihara for
defamation because he referred in a Shukan Josei interview to
women—not the plaintiffs in particular, just women—as old
hags (babaa) (they lost). Three years later, the governor had
new foes: a group of French and Japanese teachers of French,
demanding $100,000 and an apology for his remark that French
is “disqualiﬁed as an international language” because it “cannot
count numbers.” In 2002 superstar kygen actor Motoya Izumi
claimed that the Japan Noh Association defamed him when it
kicked him out for his tardiness, double booking, and unauthorized use of the “headmaster” title (he lost and became a pro
wrestler). In a 1998 case, Kabuki actor Ennosuke Ichikawa sued
an overexuberant fan who claimed one too many times that
she was engaged to marry him (he won). Or how about this
one from 1988: a senior citizen sued the chairman of a senior
citizens’ club for the damage that he claimed to have incurred
when he was kicked out for playing his accordion too long and
generally annoying everybody (he lost).
The plaintiffs seem to be using defamation law to get at
something else; perhaps it serves as a means of expressing
anger, as a means for gaining ofﬁcial approval or public recognition of a position, or as a substitute for other remedies that are
difﬁcult to obtain in Japan. The Tokyo women were making a
statement about sexism and inappropriate language; one of the
lead plaintiffs effectively admitted as much when she said, “I
know I’m an old hag, but Mr. Ishihara is not entitled to call me
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that.” The kyogen
actor seems to
have simply tacked
on a defamation
claim to an invalid
vote suit, and
the Kabuki actor
apparently needed
to rid himself of a
pseudo-stalker. The
senior citizens and
the French speakers
probably had hurt feelings, and they were angry.
These cases suggest that defamation cases in Japan and
America differ not only quantitatively but qualitatively as well;
we don’t see many cases of this sort in the United States. A
notable exception is the defamation suit brought by gangstarap antagonist Delores Tucker against rapper Tupac Shakur.
Shakur called Tucker a “muthafucka” in the lyrics of a popular
song. Tucker sued. She lost: the court found the word to be a
mere “vigorous epithet” that is “unpleasant at best and vulgar at
worst.” Tucker’s injury is somewhat similar to that of the Tokyo
“old hag” plaintiffs (except that Tupac’s epithet was explicitly
directed at Tucker and not at a large group). Did Tucker, a civil
rights activist who marched alongside Martin Luther King
Jr., really think that her social standing was lowered when a
deceased rapper who called many people muthafuckas labeled
her one? I suspect that her injury, though perhaps very real to
her, was of a different sort.
Compared with Japanese suits, cases like Delores Tucker’s
are rare in America. The difference in frequency lies in differing
conceptions of honor. In the United States, some suits are about
economic harm, some are about damage to reputation, and a
very few are about intrinsic notions of honor. But in Japan, it’s
honor that matters: one of the 131 women who objected to the
Tokyo Governor’s “old hag” line explained that “the honor of
older and childless women was hurt,” but that injury surely was
to the pride and personal integrity components of honor, not to
external perceptions of any of the women by others.
Note, however, that the popular Japanese concept differs
from the ofﬁcial view. The Japanese Supreme Court has made
clear that the required injury to “honor” in the Japanese statutes
“refers to social honor [shakaiteki meiyo], which does not include
a person’s subjective evaluation of his own self-worth as an
90

LQN SPRING 2007

individual, namely, what might be interpreted as pride [meiyo
kanjo, literally, personal ‘feelings of honor’].” That formulation
sounds much closer to the American concept of defamation as
reputational harm.
But what ordinary plaintiff in Japan is going to read Supreme
Court opinions? People just know that meiyo kison (defamation)
must be about damage to meiyo (honor), for why else would it
be called that?
What’s more, even the courts seem confused at times. The
Tokyo District Court has found defamation when a person is
called “ugly” (busu) and a “runt” (chibi). Those comments are
insulting, but it’s hard to see how they would lower a person’s
social standing. In a handful of cases, courts have explicitly held
defendants liable for insult-like injuries—but those courts don’t
call the injury “defamation” (meiyo kison); they call it “injury to
pride” (meiyo kanjo no shingai). When a person is called “frog
face,” or when a photograph of a nuclear power plant protestor
ﬁshing in a nearby lake is used as public relations material by
the power plant, or when a person tries to have his neighbor
legally committed to a psychiatric institution with no basis
other than hate, there’s no ground for defamation because the
plaintiff’s social standing isn’t lowered, but the defendant can
still be liable under a “pride” theory. Compare that to U.S.
courts, where the leading statement on torts says that “a certain
amount of name-calling is frequently resorted to by angry
people without any real intent to make a defamatory assertion,
and it is properly understood by reasonable listeners to amount
to nothing more.” So Delores Tucker loses against Tupac in the
United States, but she might win in Japan.
All of which suggests that when we compare the frequency
and bases for defamation actions in Japan and America, it’s not
at all clear that we’re comparing the same things. Japan seems
to place more emphasis on honor, constructing “defamation”
as a deeper, broader, or more common injury for which more
people might seek redress in a courtroom.
It’s no accident or mere happenstance of interest-group
politics that leads to this result. Such a high-proﬁle area of the
law as defamation law would not be the way it is if it did not
serve social interests. The same activist judges who harmonized
criminal and civil defamation in Japan could have revised the
system to award higher damages and require actual malice like
the American model. Instead, they have stuck to the system
that supports norms of honor, deliberately avoiding other paths
when the option has been presented.

